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Kersten: Probable Cause for Probationers/Parolees

NOTE

UNITED STATES v. HOWARD:
REFOCUSING PROBABLE CAUSE FOR
PROBATIONERS AND PAROLEES
INTRODUCTION

Imagine a probationer is released from a correctional facility. I
Pursuant to his release he must adhere to specific conditions to ensure
that he does not engage in further criminal activity, including the
warrantless search of his residence at any time. 2 These conditions have
been imposed because the probationer's criminal history indicates that he
poses an egregious threat to society. This probationer appears to be in
compliance with the conditions of his release; however, in secret, he is
engaged in the exact type of criminal activity the conditions of his
supervised release are designed to prevent.
Suppose the probation officer assigned to this probationer receives
reports from an informant indicating the probationer is regressing into
criminal activity at an unreported address. An investigation of these
reports ultimately results in the discovery of evidence suggesting the
probationer has established a "safe house,,3 where he can engage in

I This hypothetical was created by the author to illustrate the issues addressed in this Note.
The terms probationer, parolee, and supervised releasee will be used interchangeably throughout this
Note since the Ninth Circuit has recognized that there is not a "constitutional difference between
probation and parole for the purposes of the fourth amendinent." United States v. Harper, 928 F.2d
894, 896 n.l (1991).
2 See generally United States v. Knights, 534 U.s. 112,119 (2001).
3 A "safe house" is a place where a probationer could deposit the fruit of his or her illegal
activities, and where it would not be discovered pursuant to conditions of a supervised release. See
United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257,1269 (9th Cir. 2006) (Noonan, J., concurring).
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criminal activity without detection. Further proactive investigation has
been thwarted, however, due to the lack of sufficient evidence to satisfy
the ambiguous, yet stringent, probable cause standard to establish the
safe house as the probationer's residence, and thus subject it to a
warrantless search. A search of the safe house would, therefore, be
unconstitutional. 4 As a result, the probation officer is helpless to fulfill
his duty to ensure that the probationer is refraining from criminal activity
and, further, protect society's interest in preventing crime.
In United States v. Howard, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed the district court's holding that officers had probable
cause to believe Curtis Ray Howard, a probationer, resided at an
unreported address. 5 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the search of the
address violated Howard's Fourth Amendment rights. 6 In overturning
the district court's decision, the majority developed a stringent probable
cause standard, thus crippling a probation officer's ability to search a
suspected safe house. 7 The court stated that officers do not have
probable cause to believe a probationer lives at an unreported residence
when (1) visits to the probationer's reported address suggest that the
probationer continued to reside there; (2) the police watched the address
in question for a month and did not see the probationer there; (3) no
credible witnesses had seen the probationer at the address in question for
some time before the search; (4) the probationer did not have a key to the
residence in question; and (5) neither the probationer nor his or her
purported co-resident admitted to his or her residence there. 8
This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit rigidly followed circuit
precedent to create and apply an incorrect standard to determine whether
probable cause existed to believe that Howard resided at an unreported
address. The court should have determined the reasonableness of the
search by balancing Howard's reduced expectation of privacy as a
probationer with legitimate governmental interests. 9 Furthermore, the
court's analysis served to protect the property at the unreported address
See id. (Noonan, J., concurring).
United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1268 (9th Cir. 2006).
6 [d. (reversing the district court's ruling that police had probable cause to believe Howard
resided at an unreported address); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV (stating "[tlhe right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.")
7 Howard, 447 F.3d at 1268.
4

5

Sid.

See, e.g., United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001); Samson v. California,
126 S. Ct. 2193, 2197 (2006).
9
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rather than Howard's Fourth Amendment privacy rights. lO This decision
is contrary to the principle articulated in Katz v. United States, which
states the Fourth Amendment is intended to protect people, not places. II
Part I of this Note provides a background of the facts and procedural
history of Howard, followed by a discussion of the development of the
probable cause standard in the Ninth Circuit. 12 Part II examines the
court's analysis and application of the probable cause standard to the
facts in Howard, followed by a discussion of Circuit Judge John T.
Noonan's concurring opinion, which cast doubt on the constitutionality
of the majority's decision. 13 Part III argues that the court should have
balanced Howard's reduced expectation of privacy against legitimate
governmental interests to determine whether the search of the unreported
address was reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 14 Part
IV analyzes whether Howard had standing to assert his Fourth
Amendment rightS. 15 Finally, Part V concludes that the court failed to
use the correct standard to determine whether the search of the residence
in question was reasonable. 16
I.

BACKGROUND

In Howard, the Ninth Circuit engaged in an extensive factual
recitation prior to determining whether officers had probable cause to
believe Howard resided at an unreported address. 17 The court focused on
Howard's conduct, his interaction with his probation officer, and
information the officers had received indicating that Howard was
violating the conditions of his supervised release. 18 The court then
turned its analysis to the nature of the probable cause test. 19
A.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 28, 1996, Chief Judge Phillip M. Pro of the United
States District Court for the District of Nevada sentenced Curtis Ray

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id.
12 See infra notes 17-74 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 75-129 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 130-182 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 183-198 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 199-205 and accompanying text.
17 See United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1258-62 (9th Cir. 2006).
18 See id. at 1266-67.
19 See id. at 1262.
10

II
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Howard ("Howard") to ninety-six months of incarceration and three
years of supervised release following his guilty plea to one count of bank
robbery.2o On April 14, 2003, Howard was placed on supervised release
under the supervision of Probation Officer Robert Aquino ("Aquino,,).21
Howard's release was subject to several conditions, including a
"warrantless search of his residence, person, property, and automobile at
any time.'.22 Furthermore, Howard was precluded from associating with
convicted felons. 23 Howard reported his residence as 4879 East Owens,
Las Vegas, Nevada ("East Owens,,).24
Shortly after his release, Howard met Tami Barner ("Barner,,).25 On
May 14, 2003, Barner met with Aquino to request permission to continue
her relationship with Howard. 26 Barner was denied permission to
associate with Howard because the relationship violated a condition of
his release, since Barner was a seven-time convicted felon and a
recovering cocaine addict. 27
Howard agreed to discontinue the
relationship to abide by the conditions of his supervised release. 28
On February 3, 2004, a confidential informant who claimed to know
Howard contacted Aquino. 29 The informant told Aquino that Howard
was living at 2221 West Bonanza ("West Bonanza"), had a firearm at the
apartment, and spent time at a local tavern known for gang activity.3o
However, the informant could not specify which apartment Howard was
living in within the West Bonanza complex. 31 Barner had previously
told Aquino that she resided in apartment forty-nine at 2221 West
Bonanza. 32
To investigate, Aquino drove to the West Bonanza apartment and
20 ld. at 1258. See Brief for Appellant at 2, United States v. Howard, No. 05-10469 (9th Cir.
Oct. 13,2005); Appellee's Answering Brief at 2, United States v. Howard, No. 05-10469 (9th Cir.
Nov. 23, 2005).
21 Howard, 447 F.3d at 1258.
22 See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that the purpose of this condition was to
ensure Howard was abiding by further conditions of his supervised release); see also infra notes
143-151 and accompanying text (discussing this distinction).
23 United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir. 2006).
24 ld.
25 ld.
26 1d.

27 1d. (noting Aquino informed both Barner and Howard that their relationship must be
terminated).
2JJ ld.
29

United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir. 2006).

30 ld.

31 Id. The confidential informant also stated that he or she had not seen Howard for two
weeks and denied having a motive to fabricate information. ld.
32 1d.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol37/iss3/3

4

Kersten: Probable Cause for Probationers/Parolees

2007]PROBABLE CAUSE FOR PROBATIONERS/PAROLEES 519
then to the East Owens address. 33 Aquino did not observe Howard at
either address, nor did he see him the following day at the tavern
suggested by the informant. 34 Aquino later returned to the West Bonanza
complex and contacted the apartment manager who, after seeing a
picture of Howard, stated that he had seen Howard at the complex and
that Howard's car had been parked in the parking 10t. 35 This information
was corroborated by the president of the condominium owners
association, who stated that he had seen Howard visiting Barner at the
complex. 36
Aquino's visit to the West Bonanza complex heightened his concern
that Howard was violating the conditions of his release by residing at the
West Bonanza apartment and engaging in criminal activity.37 Further,
Aquino grew increasingly concerned because he attempted to visit
Howard at the East Owens address ten times, yet found him there only
twice. 38 Moreover, Aquino had made morning visits to the East Owens
address because, based on his knowledge of Howard's work schedule,
this was the time Howard was most likely to be home. 39 However,
Howard was present on Aquino's most recent visit to the East Owens
address.40 This address appeared to be Howard's residence because there
were pictures, clothes, and furniture in the house. 41
Aquino contacted the local police department to determine whether
Howard was the subject of any investigations. 42 A member of the Las
Vegas Metropolitan Gang Unit told Aquino there were no ongoing
investigations concerning Howard. 43 However, a gang-unit officer later
informed Aquino that a teliable informant stated that Howard was a gun
dealer and possibly a leader of the West Coast Bloods. 44
On February 7, Aquino received a second call from the original

34

Jd.
Jd.

35

United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir. 2006).

33

Jd.
37 Jd.

36

Jd. at 1259-60.
Jd. at 1260. Aquino knew, however, that Howard's work schedule was subject to change
and that Howard was not required to report such changes. Jd. Prior to the tip from the informant,
Aquino had not been concerned that Howard was not residing at the East Owens address. Jd.
40 Jd.
38

39

41 United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1260 (9th Cir. 2006). Furthermore, on another
occasion when Howard was not at the East Owens address, Aquino had spoken with one of
Howard's neighbors, who suggested that Howard still resided there. Jd.

Jd.
Jd.
44 Jd.
42

43
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informant, who stated that Howard's vehicle was currently at the West
Bonanza apartment. 45 Aquino immediately drove to the West Bonanza
apartment complex, where he observed Howard's vehicle parked directly
below Barner's apartment. 46 Aquino enlisted the help of other officers to
conduct surveillance on both the East Owens residence and the West
Bonanza apartment beginning February 10.47 As of March 8, when the
surveillance ended, officers had not affIrmatively seen Howard at the
West Bonanza apartment. 48 On March 17, Aquino returned to the leasing
offIce and a leasing agent told him that Howard had been seen at the
West Bonanza apartment roughly a week and a half before. 49
Aquino secured an order from the probation department to search
both the West Bonanza apartment and the East Owens residence. 50 On
March 30, at 6:00 a.m., Aquino arrived at the East Owens apartment to
search Howard's residence, but he did not see Howard's car parked in
the parking 10t. 51 At approximately 6:30 a.m., Aquino drove to the West
Bonanza apartment, where he observed Howard's car parked below
Barner's apartment. 52 While waiting for the search team to arrive,
Aquino observed Howard emerge from the apartment without a shirt on
and stand in the doorway for ten to fifteen minutes. 53
Barner and Howard subsequently left the West Bonanza apartment
and began walking in different directions. 54 After they separated,
Aquino and another member of the search team confronted Barner. 55
Barner was notified that officers were going to conduct a search of her
apartment based upon Howard's presence there. 56 Barner stated that
Howard did not reside at the apartment, that he, did not have a key, and
that she refused consent to the search. 57
Meanwhile, Howard had been handcuffed for officer safety and read
his Miranda rights. 58 Howard admitted that he stayed at the West
1d.
46 ld.

45

United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257,1260 (9th Cir. 2006).
ld.
49
1d.
50 1d.
5! Id.
52 1d. at 1261.
53 United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1261 (9th Cir. 2006).
54 ld.
55 1d.
56 ld.
57/d.
Barner acknowledged, however, that Howard had personal belongings in her
apartment. /d.
58 United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1261 (9th Cir. 2006); see generally Miranda v.
47

48
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Bonanza apartment, but denied living there and stated that he did not
have a key to the apartment. 59 Barner was given permission to leave the
scene, and she again refused to consent to a search of her apartment. 60
The officers attempted to gain entry to the West Bonanza apartment by
using Howard's keys in the lock, but they were unsuccessfu1. 61
The apartment owner approached the officers and let them into
Barner's apartment. 62 Aquino was approached by another resident of the
complex who stated that she had seen Howard at the West Bonanza
apartment at least eighty to ninety percent of the time. 63 The officers'
search revealed a gun wrapped in a hat, concealed in a closet. 64 Howard
admitted that the gun was his. 65 However, Howard's only other
possessions at the apartment were an alarm clock and a prescription with
Howard's name on it. 66
At his indictment, Howard challenged the constitutionality of the
search and sought to suppress his statements as fruit of the poisonous
tree. 67 Following an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate entered a finding
that the search was constitutional and that the incriminating statements
were voluntary. 68 The district court adopted these findings, and Howard
entered a conditional plea of guilty to charges that he knowingly received
a firearm. 69

Arizona, 384 U.s. 436, 467 (1966) (holding that "[i]n order to combat these pressures [of custodial
interrogation] and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the
accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights
must be fully honored."); see also id. at 478-79 (requiring that when an individual is taken into
custody, he or she must be apprised of the right to remain silent, that anything said will be used in
court, that he or she has a right to an attorney, and that if the individual cannot afford an attorney one
will be provided).
59 United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1261 (9th Cir. 2006).
60 Id.
61
1d.
62 1d. But see id. n.3 (stating that the government conceded that the apartment owner did not
have the power to consent to a search of the apartment).
63 1d. at 1261.
64 ld.

United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1261 (9th Cir. 2006).
ld.
67 1d. See generally Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,484 (1963) (holding that
evidence obtained by officers during an unlawful search must be excluded as fruits of such illegality;
furthermore, "[t]he exclusionary prohibition extends as well to the indirect as the direct products of
such invasions.").
68 Howard, 447 F.3d at 1261.
69 1d. at 1261-62. Howard reserved the right to appeal the validity of the probation search
and was sentenced to 120 months, followed by 3 years of supervised release. Id.
65

66
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AN INTRA-CIRCUIT SPLIT RESOLVED

In the Ninth Circuit, prior to Motley v. Parks, decided in 2005, there
was an intra-circuit split regarding the correct standard to use in
determining whether a parolee resides at an unreported address. 7o The
court in United States v. Dally held that a parolee may be searched
pursuant to a consent provision in his parole terms, if his parole officer
reasonably believed that a search was appropriate. 71 Furthermore, the
Dally court required police to have a "reasonable belief' that a parolee
resides at a particular place before conducting a parole search.72 In
contrast, the court in United States v. Harper held that officers must have
probable cause to believe that a parolee is a resident of an address before
conducting a warrantless search. 73 Motley v. Parks resolved this intracircuit split by holding that "before conducting a warrantless search
pursuant to a parolee's parole condition, law enforcement officers must
have probable cause to believe that the parolee is a resident of the house
to be searched.,,74
II.

THE MAJORITY OPINION: THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

In Howard, Circuit Judge Jay S. Bybee, writing for the court,
implicitly recognized that the court in Harper stated that there was no
constitutional difference between probation and parole for the purposes
of determining the validity of a warrantless search. 75 The Howard court
then examined a series of prior decisions, in which the Ninth Circuit had
found probable cause, to articulate what factors must be considered in
determining whether the stringent probable cause standard for finding a
See Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072, 1074 (9th Cir. 2005).
United States v. Dally, 606 F.2d 861,863 (9th Cir. 1979).
72 Id; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,21 (1968) (stating that to justify a search based on
reasonable suspicion, an officer must be able to "point to specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion."). The terms
"belief' and "suspicion" are used interchangeably throughout the cases discussed in this Note.
73 United States v. Harper, 928 F.2d 894,896 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213,245 n.l3 (1983) (stating that "[iJn making a determination of probable cause the relevant
inquiry is not whether particular conduct is 'innocent' or 'guilty,' but the degree of suspicion that
attaches to particular types of non-criminal acts."). Probable cause is a more stringent standard than
reasonable suspicion because probable cause focuses on the degree of suspicion associated with a
particular act as opposed to the particularized facts taken with inferences involved in reasonable
suspicion. Compare Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,21 (1968), with Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 245
n.l3 (1983).
74 Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005).
7S See United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1262 n.5 (9th Cir. 2006) (referring to the
applicable standard to determine whether a parolee or a probationer resides at a particular residence);
see also United States v. Harper, 928 F.2d 894, 896 n.l (9th Cir. 1991).
70

71
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parolee resides at a particular place is satisfied. 76 The court concluded
the relevant factors to be the following: (1) whether the parolee appeared
to be residing at any address other than the one searched; 77 (2) whether
officers had directly observed something that gave them good reason to
suspect that the parolee was using the unreported residence as a home
base; 78 (3) whether the parolee had a key to the residence in question; 79
and (4) whether the parolee's co-resident, or the parolee himself,
identified the residence in question as that of the parolee. 8o In analyzing
these factors, the court stated that when presented with weak facts, it
would not hesitate to rule that officers could not justify a search for lack
of probable cause. Sl Confusingly, the court's analysis gave some of the
factors more weight than others, yet no factor alone was intended to be
Howard, 447 F.3d at 1262-66.
See Howard, 447 F.3d at 1265-66; see also United States v. Conway, 122 F.3d 841, 84243 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating an officer had been to a probationer's reported address twenty-one times
and found him there only once). In Conway, the probationer's only possession at his reported
address was a pair of socks. Conway, 122 F.3d at 842-43. See also United States v. Watts, 67 F.3d
790, 792 (9th Cir. 1995) (recognizing an informant stated that the probationer was living at an
unreported address, driving a Ford Taurus, and selling cocaine; further. the probationer was followed
to the unreported address); United States v. Harper, 928 F.2d 894, 895 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting police
believed a parolee was violating the conditions of his parole by manufacturing drugs; however, the
agents did not have his current address); United States v. Dally, 606 F.2d 861, 862 (9th Cir. 1979)
(noting a parole agent was unsuccessful in locating a parolee at his unreported address).
78 See Howard, 447 F.3d at 1265-66; see also Conway, 122 F.3d at 842-43 (recognizing a
probation officer confirmed an informant's tip that a probationer walked his dog around the
unreported address, was known by his "street moniker" in the neighborhood, and was seen leaving
the unreported address early in the morning). In Conway, the probationer told the probation officer
that he had a dog at the unreported address; furthermore, while at the unreported address, the
probation officer noticed mail and notes addressed to the probationer. Conway, 122 F.3d at 842-43.
See also Watts, 67 F.3d at 792-93 (stating officers confirmed the probationer was driving a Taurus
that had been seen parked in the driveway of the unreported address and noting the probationer was
observed walking to the front door of his reported address, knocking, waiting for an answer, and
then leaving when no one responded); Harper, 928 F.2d at 895 (noting that acting on a tip, police
began surveillance on the parolee's brothers' house where he was seen entering and exiting the
residence); Daily, 606 F.2d at 862 (recognizing agents notified the parole agent the parolee was
residing at a different address and was seen driving a car parked at the address overnight).
79 See Howard, 447 F.3d at 1265-66; see also Conway, 122 F.3d at 843 (noting that the
probationer opened the door of the unreported address with his own key to allow the officer access
to the residence); Watts, 67 F.3d at 793 (conftmling a search of the probationer's vehicle resulted in
the discovery of keys and a garage door opener that were later confrrmed to be for the unreported
address); Harper, 928 F.2d at 895 (noting the parolee was seen entering the unreported address with
his own key); Daily, 606 F.2d at 863 (stating the parolee was observed entering and exiting the
residence by the use of his own key while carrying dry cleaning).
80 See Howard, 447 F.3d at 1265-66; see also Conway, 122 F.3d at 843 (recognizing that the
probationer identified the bedroom at the unreported address as his); Watts, 67 F.3d at 793 (noting
the probationer's girlfriend informed the police that they lived together at the house in question).
81 See United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1265 (9th Cir. 2006). But see id. at 1266
n.13 (stating that the final factor, a denial by the parolee or his co-resident that the parolee lives at
the unreported address, is not necessarily credible because it can be tinged with self-interest).
76

77
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dispositive. 82
A.

APPLICATION OF THE ESTABLISHED PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARD

The Howard court first articulated the factors that would establish
probable cause to believe a probationer resides at an unreported address,
then applied the factors to the facts of the case. 83 The court compared the
facts in United States v. Dally, United States v. Harper, United States v.
Conway, and United States v. Watts to the facts in Howard and
concluded that none of the factors were met. 84 Therefore, officers lacked
probable cause to believe that Howard resided at the West Bonanza
apartment. 85 The court held that the search of the West Bonanza
apartment violated Howard's Fourth Amendment rights. 86 Consequently,
the court excluded the gun discovered at the apartment and Howard's
confession as fruit of the poisonous tree. 8?
First, the court analyzed whether Howard appeared to be residing at
the East Owens address. 88 Aquino testified that he had visited Howard at
the East Owens address ten times yet found him there only twice. 89
However, Aquino opined that this was not a low success rate in light of
Howard's work schedule. 90 Aquino testified that he had spoken to
Howard's neighbors while attempting to visit him at the East Owens
address. 91 One neighbor told Aquino that he had just missed Howard,

82 See. e.g .• Howard, 447 F.3d at 1267 (focusing on the fact that Aquino did not suspect that
Howard was not living at the East Owens address until the tip from the confidential informant, and
that Howard did not have a key to the West Bonanza apartment). The court focused on the
information officers did not have, as opposed to the information they had obtained, such as the
information given by the confidential informant, statements by neighbors, and observations on the
morning of the search. See id.
83 See Howard, 447 F.3d at 1266-68.
84 Id. at 1265-67.
85 1d. at 1268.
86
1d.

United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1268 (9th Cir. 2006).
See id. at 1266-68.
89/d. at 1266. The court noted that in Conway, officers attempted to visit Conway at his
reported address twenty times and found him there only once, thus Aquino's success rate of 20% is
much higher than the 5% success rate in Conway. Id. at 1265, 1266. But see Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 232 (1983) (stating that "probable cause is a fluid concept - turning on the assessment of
probabilities in particular factual contexts - not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of
legal rules.") Instead, the court's analysis in Howard created an arbitrary legal rule rather than a
fluid probability by implying that a certain percentage of successful officer visits, somewhere
between 5% and 20%, are required to establish probable cause to believe that a parolee is residing at
the address. See Howard, 447 F.3d at 1265-66.
90 Howard, 447 F.3d at 1266.
91 Id. at 1267.
87

88
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and another stated that Howard was still living at the East Owens
address. 92 There was also no indication that Howard did not respond to
messages left at the East Owens address. 93 Moreover, the court found
that more evidence existed to show that Howard resided at the East
Owens address rather than at the West Bonanza apartment. 94 The court
concluded that simply observing Howard at the West Bonanza
apartment, while he visited Barner, was insufficient to create probable
cause to believe he lived there. 95
On March 30, the day of the search, the apartment manager, who
had seen Howard in the complex in early February, told the officers that
he had not seen Howard for about a week. 96 The best evidence police
had indicating that Howard lived at the West Bonanza apartment was a
statement by one of Barner's neighbors, who stated that she had seen
Howard there at least eighty to ninety percent of the time. 97 This
statement, however, was inconsistent with what officers observed during
surveillance and contradicted prior statements made by the apartment
complex staff members. 98 The court reasoned that the ftrst factor to
establish probable cause was not satisfted because Howard appeared to
be residing at the East Owens address and not the West Bonanza
apartment. 99
Turning to the second factor, the court examined whether officers
directly observed something that gave them good reason to suspect that
Howard was using the unreported West Bonanza apartment as a home
base. IOO The court focused on the fact that police had watched the West
Bonanza residence for nearly an entire month and there were no reports
of Howard entering the apartment complex during that period. 101 Prior to
March 30, the day of the search, officers had not seen Howard or his car
at the West Bonanza complex since February 7.((12 The court concluded
that the officers had not directly observed anything that gave them good

ld.
93 United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1267 (9th Cir. 2006).
94 ld.
95 ld.
96 ld.
97 ld.
98
ld.
92

United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1267 (9th Cir. 2006).
at 1266-67.
101 ld. at 1267.
102 ld. The court also noted that February 7 was the last day the officers had been in contact
with the confidential informant who had originally stated Howard lived with Barner at the West
Bonanza apartment. ld.
99

100 ld.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2007

11

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 3

)526

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

reason to suspect that Howard lived at the West Bonanza apartment. 103
Third, the court focused on whether Howard had a key to the West
Bonanza apartment. 104 The police knew Howard did not have a key to
the West Bonanza apartment because they checked each of his keys
against the door on the morning of the search. 105 Jacobs, the West
Bonanza complex manager, unlocked the apartment door so the officers
could conduct their search.I06 The court stated this factor was in stark
contrast to Dally, Harper, Watts, and Conway because the parolee had a
key to the unreported address in each of those cases. 107
Fourth, the court examined whether Barner or Howard identified the
West Bonanza address as Howard's residence. 108 In contrast to Conway,
neither Howard nor Barner told the officers that Howard lived at the
West Bonanza apartment. 109 Howard and Barner both admitted that
Howard had a few personal belongings in the apartment, yet they also
stated he was not a resident. 110 The court acknowledged that such
statements are tinged with self-interest and that Barner clearly had a
motive to lie because she knew that Howard was violating his parole by
associating with her. III
The court concluded that the officers did not have probable cause to
believe Howard resided at the West Bonanza apartment,112 overruling the
district court on that point. 113 Therefore, both the gun found at the

/d. at 1268.
Id. at 1266.
105 United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1267 (9th Cir. 2006).
106 /d.
103

104

107 1d.; see United States v. Conway, 122 F.3d 841, 843 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that the
probationer opened the door of the umeported address with his own key to allow the officer access
to the residence); United States v. Watts, 67 F.3d 790,793 (9th Cir. 1995) (focusing on a search of
the probationer's vehicle resulted in the discovery of keys and a garage door opener that were later
confirmed to be for the umeported address); United States v. Harper, 928 F.2d 894, 895 (9th Cir.
1991) (noting the parolee was see entering the umeported address with his own key); United States
v. Dally, 606 F.2d 861, 863 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating the parolee was observed entering and exiting
the residence by the use of his own key while carrying dry cleaning).
lOS Howard, 447 F.3d at 1266.
109 1d. at 1267. Compare United States v. Conway, 122 F.3d 841, 843 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting
that Conway said his dog was at the umeported residence and identified a room at the residence as
his).
110 Howard, 447 F.3d at 1267.
III United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1266 n.13 (9th Cir. 2006). The court stated
further that Barner's relationship with Howard presumably violated her parole, so she had reason to
downplay the extent of her contact with Howard to keep herself out of custody. /d.
112 1d. at 1268. Although the Howard court stated that there were five factors to determine
whether probable cause existed to believe a parolee is residing at an unreported address, the court
did not expressly analyze the credibility of the witnesses involved in the case. Id. at 1266-68.
113 1d. at 1268.
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apartment and Howard's confession were excluded as fruit of the
poisonous tree. 114
B.

THE CONCURRING OPINION, DUBITANTE: A CLOSER LOOK Is
REQUIRED

Circuit Judge John T. Noonan, Jr., filed a concurring oplmon,
dubitante,115 stating that in adherence to the Motley decision, officers
must have probable cause to believe that a parolee is a resident of the
house to be searched before conducting a warrantless search pursuant to
a parolee's parole condition. 116 However, Judge Noonan stated that
although he "[could not] deny the controlling standard set by Motley and
the pattern of what constitutes probable cause [was] not unreasonably
presented" by the majority, he doubted whether circuit precedent
conformed to the Constitution as interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Knights. ll7
Judge Noonan explained that in Knights, the Supreme Court held
that the distinction between probationary searches and investigative
searches was without foundation. 118 In Knights, the Court analyzed the
reasonableness of the search of the probationer's residences by balancing
the degree a search intruded on a probationer's privacy with the degree a
search was necessary to promote a legitimate governmental interest. 119
Judge Noonan drew attention to the fact that the Knights Court noted a
"probationer was a person undergoing punishment. ... [and does] not
enjoy 'some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.'"120 With regard
to the government's interests, the Court found "it is 'the very assumption
of the institution of probation' that a probationer is more likely than an
ordinary citizen to violate the law.,,121 Further, Judge Noonan noted one
prevalent governmental interest was the realization of the strong
Id.
The word "dubitante" is used "next to a judge's name, indicating that the judge doubted a
legal point but was unwilling to state that it was wrong." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 537 (8th ed.
2004).
116 United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1268 (9th Cir. 2006) (Noonan, J., concurring).
117 Id. (Noonan, J., concurring); see also United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121-22
(2001).
118 Howard, 447 F.3d at 1268 (Noonan, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Knights, 534
U.S. 112, 121-22 (2001».
119 Howard, 447 F.3d at 1268 (Noonan, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Knights, 534
U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001».
120 Howard, 447 F.3d at 1268 (Noonan, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Knights, 534
U.S. 112. 119 (200 I» (internal quotation marks omitted).
121 Howard, 447 F.3d at 1268-69 (Noonan, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Knights,
534 U.S. 112, 120 (2001».
114
115
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"incentive that a probationer has to go to greater lengths to conceal his
new criminal activity, which, if detected, will send him back to prison in
a summary proceeding." 122
In applying the balancing test from Knights, Judge Noonan stated
that the majority's analysis did not account for Howard's diminished
expectation of privacy, or for the government's interest in preventing his
possession of a fIrearm. 123 Furthermore, Judge Noonan opined that, in
effect, the majority created a safe house where Howard could stash a gun
and engage in further criminal activity.124 Such a consequence was a
result of the majority's rigid application of precedent without taking the
Knights perspective of reasonableness into account when analyzing
probable cause.125 Finally, Judge Noonan recognized that the Supreme
Court in Katz held that the Fourth Amendment protects people not
places, a decision that enlarged the scope of protection. 126 However,
application of the same concept here contracted the protection of the
Fourth Amendment. 127 The majority's decision protected the property of
the West Bonanza apartment. 128 According to Judge Noonan, the Fourth
Amendment was not designed to offer this type of sanctuary to felons
serving part of their sentence on parole. 129

m.

REASONABLENESS: THE TRUE FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prescribes
that, "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause ...
.,,130 The Knights Court held reasonableness to be the "touchstone" of a
Fourth Amendment analysis. 131 A balancing test is required to assess

United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1269 (9th Cir. 2006) (Noonan. 1.. concurring).
[d. (Noonan, J., concurring).
124 [d. (Noonan, J., concurring).
125 [d. (Noonan, J., concurring).
126 [d. (Noonan, J., concurring); see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan,
J., concurring); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affumation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
127 United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1269 (9th Cir. 2006) (Noonan, J., concurring).
128 [d. (Noonan, J., concurring).
129 [d. (Noonan, J., concurring).
130 U.S. CONST. amend IV. Probable cause must be "supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." [d.
131 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001).
122
123
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such reasonableness, in which the degree of intrusion into an individual's
privacy is weighed against legitimate governmental interests. 132
Reasonableness is established if, at the time of the search, officers are
aware of facts "sufficient to support a belief, in 'a man of reasonable
caution,'" that criminal activity is afoot. 133
In Howard, the Ninth Circuit used the incorrect standard to
determine whether probable cause existed to believe that Howard was
violating a condition of his supervised release. l34 The court should have
determined the reasonableness of the search by balancing Howard's
reduced expectation of privacy with legitimate governmental interests. 135
Furthermore, the court's opinion is flawed because it recognized a
distinction between probationary searches pursuant to a condition of a
supervised release and investigative searches directed at uncovering
evidence of criminal activity, yet this distinction is without foundation. 136
The Howard court applied a stringent standard, considering four
factors, to determine whether probable cause existed to believe that
Howard was violating a condition of his supervised release by residing at
the West Bonanza apartment. 137 However, the court failed to determine
whether the search of the West Bonanza apartment was reasonable
because the court did not apply the test, articulated in Knights and
affirmed in Samson v. California, which balances a parolee's reduced
expectation of privacy with legitimate governmental interests. 138 The
majority relied on the Motley decision, which held that before conducting
a warrantless search pursuant to a parolee's parole condition, officers
must have probable cause to believe that a parolee is a resident of the

132 See id. at 118-19 (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)); see also
Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193,2197 (2006).
133 United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1262 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Texas v. Brown,
460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983)).
134 See Howard, 447 F.3d at 1268-69 (Noonan, J., concurring).
135 See id. at 1268 (Noonan, J., concurring). Knights and Samson require application of the
balancing test to determine the existence of probable cause. Knights, 534 U.S. at 118-19; Samson,
126 S. Ct. at 2197; see also Howard, 447 F.3d at 1268.
136 See Howard, 447 F.3d at 1268 (Noonan, J., concurring); see also infra notes 143-151 and
accompanying text.
137 See Howard, 447 F.3d at 1265-67. But see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)
(stating "probable cause is a fluid concept - turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular
factual contexts - not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.") The test created
by the majority, focusing on a series of factors to detennine whether officers have probable cause to
believe a probationer is residing at a particular place, creates a "neat set of legal rules" that, in effect,
would not be applicable to all situations and could not be applied in a uniform fashion. See Howard,
447 F.3d at 1268.
138 See Howard, 447 F.3d at 1268 (Noonan, J., concurring); see also United States v. Knights,
534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001); Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2197 (2006).
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house to be searched. 139 The Motley court recognized that requlflng
officers to have probable cause to believe that a parolee resides at a
particular address prior to conducting a search protects the interests of
third parties. l40 However, if a third party or the parolee does not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a place, he or she does not have
standing to assert a Fourth Amendment violation. 141 This creates a
contradiction because Howard, if not a resident at the West Bonanza
apartment, could not claim that Aquino's search violated his Fourth
Amendment rights. 142
A.

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PROBATION AND INVESTIGATIVE
SEARCHES Is WITHOUT FOUNDATION

There is no constitutional requirement that a search condition in a
probation order must be seen as limited to probation searches, thereby
excluding investigative searches. 143 In Knights, the Supreme Court held
that the distinction between probationary searches, pursuant to conditions
of release, and investigative searches, directed at uncovering evidence of
criminal activity by a felon on probation, lacks foundation. 144
Furthermore, the Court in Knights stated that searches have been upheld
pursuant to probation conditions, "whether the purpose of the search is to
monitor the probationer or to serve some other law enforcement
purpose." 145 Thus the distinction recognized by the Howard court,
focusing on whether Howard was in compliance with the conditions of

139 See United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1262 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Motley v.
Parks, 432 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005) (determining, in a § 1983 suit brought by a tenant, that
officers were required to have probable cause to believe that a parolee resided at a particular place
before conducting a search). Motley, the plaintiff, was the parolee's girlfriend, not the parolee
himself. Motley, 432 F.3d at 1075.
140 See Motley, 432 F.3d at 1080.
141 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
143-44 (1978).
142 See Howard, 447 F.3d at 1268; see also infra notes 183-198 and accompanying text.
143 See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 117 (2001).
144 See Howard, 447 F.3d at 1268 (Noonan, J., concurring) (citing Knights, 534 U.S. at 117);
see, e.g., Knights, 534 U.S. at 121 (holding that warrantless searches are reasonable within the
Fourth Amendment when a legitimate governmental interest outweighs an individual's expectation
of privacy); Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2202 (2006) (expanding the holding in Knights,
which is directed at special needs searches, by concluding that suspicionJess searches are reasonable
within the Fourth Amendment).
145 Knights, 534 U.S. at 116 (quoting People v. Woods, 981 P.2d 1019, 1027,21 Cal. 4th 668,
681 (Cal. 1999». In Knights, the Supreme Court concluded that the Supreme Court of California's
rejection of the distinction between "investigative" and "probationary" searches was constitutional.
See Knights, 534 U.S. at 121.
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his supervised release, is superfluous. 146
The Howard court analyzed Aquino's search as one focused on
whether Howard was complying with conditions of his supervised
release, rather than a broader search to determine if Howard was
engaging in criminal activity.147 However, there were reports that
Howard was a leader of the West Coast Bloods and was engaged in the
sale of firearms. 148 A limitation on the scope of probation searches
hinders the ability of law enforcement to further governmental interests
of thwarting crime and protecting society from criminal activity.149
Furthermore, the Howard court erred in basing its determination on
the propriety of a probation search to find that the officers lacked
probable cause to believe Howard was violating the conditions of his
release by residing at the West Bonanza apartment. ISO Rather, the court
should have determined the need for an investigative search.
Additionally, the court should have determined the reasonableness of the
search by balancing Howard's reduced expectation of privacy as a
probationer with the legitimate governmental interest of ensuring that
Howard was not engaged in criminal activity. lSI Therefore, the court
used the incorrect standard to determine the constitutionality of Aquino's
search of the West Bonanza apartment.
B.

RECOGNIZING THAT PAROLEES HAVE A REDUCED EXPECTATION OF
PRNACY

The court should have recognized that Howard, due to his status as
a probationer, had a reduced expectation of privacy.IS2 According to the
146 See United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1268 (9th Cir. 2006) (Noonan, 1.,
concurring).
147 See id. at 1262.
148 [d. at 1260.
149 See Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193,2200-01 (2006) (citing Cal. Penal Code §§
2931, 2933, 3000(b)(l) (West 2000». In Samson, the Supreme Court upheld the California Court of
Appeal's holding that a suspicionless search of a parolee was valid under California law and
'''reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment as long as it is not arbitrary, capricious
or harassing.'" See Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2196 (citations omitted). The California Court of Appeal
relied on People v. Reyes, which held that a search pursuant to parole conditions, in the absence of
particularized suspicion, "does not intrude on any expectation of privacy society is prepared to
recognize as legitimate." See id.; see also People v. Reyes, 968 P.2d 445, 451,19 Cal. 4th 743, 754
(Cal. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
150 See Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2202 (holding that "the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a
police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee."). The propriety of a
probationary search (special needs search) is not a relevant inquiry now that officers can engage in
suspicionless searches of parolees and probationers. See id.
151 See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001).
152 See United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1268·69 (9th Cir. 2006) (Noonan, 1.,
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Supreme Court in Knights, "[p]robation, like incarceration, is 'a form of
criminal sanction imposed by a court upon an offender after verdict,
finding, or plea of guilty. ",153 There is no constitutional difference
between probation and parole for purposes of the Fourth Amendment
when determining whether a search is reasonable. 154 A consequence of
probation is the understanding that "probationers 'do not enjoy "'the
absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled. ",,,,155 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has recognized that "as other punishments for criminal
convictions curtail an offender's freedoms, a court granting probation
may impose reasonable conditions that deprive the offender of some
freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.,,156
In Howard, the court analyzed whether officers had sufficient
probable cause to believe that Howard resided at the West Bonanza
address by comparing the facts in the case with the facts of Dally,
Harper, Watts, and Conway. 157 Significantly, however, those cases also
failed to balance the parolees' reduced expectations of privacy with
legitimate governmental interests. 158 Although it was reasonable for the
majority to conclude that probable cause was lacking, the
constitutionality of the precedent relied upon was questionable because
Howard's reduced expectation of privacy was not taken into account in
accordance with the requirements previously mandated by the Supreme
Court. 159
Howard was on probation for a bank robbery conviction; 160 thus, he
had a reduced expectation of privacy due to his prior criminal history. 161
This was reflected in the conditions of Howard's release that permitted

concurring).
153 See Knights, 534 U.S. at 119 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 438 U.S. 868, 874 (1987)
(quoting G. KiLLINGER, H. KERPER, & P. CROMWELL, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 14 (1976))).
154 See United States v. Harper, 928 F.2d 894,896 n.l (9th Cir. 1991).
155 Knights, 534 U.S. at 119 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868,874 (1987) (quoting
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972»).
156 Knights, 534 U.S. at 120.
The Knights Court found it unnecessary to "address the
constitutionality of a suspicionless search because the search in this case was supported by
reasonable suspicion." Id. at 120 n.6. However, the Samson Court held that suspicionless searches
do not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193,2202 (2006).
157 See Howard, 447 F.3d at 1265.
158 See United States v. Conway, 122 F.3d 841, 843 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Watts,
67 F.3d 790, 795 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Harper, 928 F.2d 894, 896-97 (9th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Dally, 606 F.2d 861, 863 (9th Cir. 1979).
159 See United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1268 (9th Cir. 2006) (Noonan, J.,
concurring) .
• 60 /d. at 1258 .
•61 See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001).
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warrantless searches of his residence, person, property, and automobile at
any time. 162 Howard was also prohibited from associating with any
persons engaged in criminal activity. 163 Aquino began an investigation
of Howard's compliance with the conditions of his supervised release
upon receiving anonymous tips that Howard was living with Barner and
engaging in further criminal activity.l64 Howard argued that the search
of the West Bonanza apartment, which resulted in the discovery of a
loaded revolver and a confession, violated his Fourth Amendment rights
because he had an expectation of privacy at the apartment. 165 However,
the court did not account for Howard's reduced expectation of privacy as
a probationer when analyzing whether the search was reasonable, which
resulted in the erroneous reversal of the district court's finding of
probable cause. l66 The court recognized Howard's expectation of
privacy as an ordinary citizen, rather than considering his reduced
expectation of privacy as a probationer. 167
C.

A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT INTEREST TO KEEP A GUN OUT OF
HOWARD'S HANDS

The court did not recognize the legitimate governmental interest in
preventing Howard, a convicted felon, from engaging in criminal activity
when it reversed the district court's holding that probable cause existed
to believe Howard was residing at the West Bonanza apartment. 168 In
assessing legitimate governmental interests "it must be remembered that
'the very assumption of the institution of probation' is that the
probationer 'is more likely than the ordinary citizen to violate the
law. ",169
Furthermore, "[t]he recidivism rate of probationers is
See Howard, 447 F.3d at 1258.
Id.
164 Id. at 1259-60.
165 United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1262 (9th Cir. 2006).
166 Cf Marc R. Lewis, Comment, Lost In Probation: Contrasting the Treatment of
Probationary Search Agreements in California and Federal Courts. 51 UCLA L. REv. 1703, 1706
(2004) (stating "[b]ecause a probationer'S consent to search eliminates the probationer's expectation
of privacy, subsequent searches do not need to be justified by either probable cause or reasonable
suspicion."). See also Howard, 447 F.3d at 1262.
167 See Edward J. Loya, Jr., Comment, Probationers, Parolees, and the Fourth Amendment:
Addressing Unanswered Questions. 35 CUMB. L. REv. 101, 106-07 (2005) (stating "analysis of the
Supreme Court's prelil1'Jnary, albeit somewhat ambiguous, guidelines for evaluating reasonable
suspicion strongly supports the conclusion that probationer and parolee status should be taken into
account."). See also Howard, 447 F.3d at 1262.
168 See Howard, 447 F.3d at 1268.
169 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 120 (2001) (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483
U.S. 868,880 (1987)).
162
163
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significantly higher than the general crime rate" of ordinary citizens. 17o
The State has a dual concern with a probationer because, although the
goal of probation is to integrate the probationer back into the community,
a major concern of integration is that a probationer will be more likely to
engage in criminal conduct than an average citizen. 171 The State also has
a legitimate interest in apprehending violators of the criminal law to
fulfill its duty to society by protecting potential victims of criminal
conduct. 172 Therefore, the State may justifiably focus law-enforcement
efforts on probationers in a way that it may not on ordinary citizens. 173
"Although the Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires the degree of
probability embodied in the term 'probable cause,' a lesser degree
satisfies the Constitution when the balance of governmental and private
interests makes such a standard reasonable." 174
The information received by Aquino indicated that Howard might
have been engaging in criminal activity, and there was a legitimate
governmental interest in preventing such activity.175 Howard was a
supervised releasee on probation from a bank robbery.176 Further,
Howard was associating with Barner, a seven-time convicted felon and a
recovering cocaine addict. 177 Finally, confidential informants told

170 Knights, 534 U.S. at 120 (citing U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau
of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of Felons on Probation, 1986-89, 1,6 (Feb. 1992) (reporting that
forty-three percent of 79,000 felons placed on probation in seventeen states were rearrested for a
felony within three years while still on probation); U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Justice Programs,
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Probation and Parole Violators in State Prison, 1991, 3 (Aug. 1995)
(stating that in 1991, twenty-three percent of state prisoners were probation violators)).
171 See Knights, 534 U.S. at 121.
172 See id. at 120-21 (noting that "probationers have even more of an incentive to conceal their
criminal activities and quickly dispose of incriminating evidence than the ordinary criminal because
probationers are aware that they may be subject to supervision and face revocation of probation, and
possible incarceration .... "). The majority has, in effect, created a safe house where Howard could
hide his gun so it would not be discovered pursuant to a warrantless probation search. See United
States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1269 (9th Cir. 2006) (Noonan, J., concurring). This safe house
was the result of the court's failure to balance Howard's reduced expectation of privacy with
legitimate governmental interests. See id. at 1268 (Noonan, J., concurring). Further, the test created
in Howard frustrates the ability of law enforcement to proactively protect the community from
probationers continuing in their criminal activity because officers, due to their lack of legal training,
are not in a position to study circuit precedent and compare the facts of a current situation to those
analyzed in prior cases. Cf id. (Noonan, J., concurring).
173 See, e.g., Knights, 534 U.S. at 121; Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2195 (2006)
(stating that "a State's interests in reducing recidivism, thereby promoting reintegration and positive
citizenship among probationers and parolees, warrant privacy intrusions that would not otherwise be
tolerated under the Fourth Amendment. ").
174 Knights, 534 U.S. at 121.
175 See United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257,1258-62 (9th Cir. 2006).
176 ld. at 1258.

m ld. at 1259.
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Aquino that Howard was among the leaders of the West Coast Bloods,
that he currently had a fIrearm at the West Bonanza apartment, and that
he was an arms dealer. 178 Therefore, the State had a legitimate interest in
determining whether Howard was engaging in criminal activity,
especially if such criminal activity was to the extent suggested by the
confidential informants.
The court failed to account for the legitimate government interest in
curbing Howard's suspected criminal activity when it reversed the
magistrate's and the district court's finding of probable cause. 179 The
court focused on Howard's interactions with Aquino and the
observations of officers, rather than Howard's criminal conduct. 180 The
decision in Howard requires the State to shut its eyes to the concern that
a probationer will be more likely to engage in criminal conduct than an
ordinary member of the community; however, the Fourth Amendment
requires States to take such a concern into account. 181 Accordingly, the
court's decision is inconsistent with contemporary Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence because the court did not account for a legitimate
governmental interest to prevent further criminal activity.182
IV. THE PURPOSE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: PROTECTING PEOPLE,
NOT PLACES

The Howard court held that the search of the West Bonanza
apartment violated Howard's Fourth Amendment right to reasonable
search and seizure,183 yet this holding is flawed in two distinct ways.
The court determined that officers did not have probable cause to believe

[d. at 1259-60.
See id. at 1268 (Noonan, J., concurring).
ISO See id. at 1266-68.
181 See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001).
182 See generally United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001); Samson v. California, 126 S.
Ct. 2193 (2006). The test created in Howard is likely to substantially increase the amount of
litigation to determine whether probable cause exists to believe a parolee resides at an unreported
address. Cf United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1268 (9th Cir. 2006) (Noonan, J., concurring)
(discussing the proper application of the Supreme Court's tests regarding probationary searches,
investigative searches, and the "significant" diminished expectation of privacy of a probationer).
Courts will have to resolve questions such as: How much direct observation by the police is
necessary to find probable cause? Was there sufficient evidence to indicate the probationer was
residing somewhere besides the reported address? Was corroboration of a confidential informant's
tips sufficient to indicate the probationer was residing at an unreported address? How much weight
will be accorded to a probationer's possession of keys for the unreported address? Was a probation
officer's rate of success in locating the probationer at his reported address sufficient to indicate that
he was still living there? See id.
183 United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1268 (9th CiT. 2006).
178
179
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Howard resided at the West Bonanza apartment, and that the subsequent
search therefore violated the Fourth Amendment. 184 Furthermore, the
court concluded that Howard had a reasonable expectation of privacy at
the West Bonanza apartment and the search was unreasonable. ls5
However, the court failed to incorporate the Knights balancing approach
into its analysis of whether the search was reasonable. 186 Therefore, the
officers could have conducted a reasonable search of the West Bonanza
apartment pursuant to the conditions of Howard's supervised release.
Alternatively, the court's opinion is flawed because concluding that
the officers lacked probable cause to believe that Howard was a resident
of the West Bonanza apartment implies that Howard did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy. 187 If Howard did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the West Bonanza apartment, it
follows that he did not have standing to assert a violation of his Fourth
Amendment rightS. 188 Therefore, the district court properly admitted the
gun and Howard's confession into evidence at trial.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is
intended to protect people, not places, yet this protection refers to places
in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. 189 Therefore,
the court's assertion that officers did not have probable cause to believe
that Howard resided at the West Bonanza apartment mistakenly protects
184
185
186

See id.
Jd.
See id. (Noonan, 1., concurring); see also United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19

(2001).
187 See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 97 (1990) (holding that status as an overnight guest
can create an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable). Howard
could still have an expectation of privacy at the apartment as an overnight guest, yet the court
analyzed whether officers had probable cause to believe Howard was a resident without accounting
for his reduced expectation of privacy as a probationer. See Olson, 495 U.S. at 97; see also Howard,
447 F.3dat 1266-68.
188 See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998) (quoting United States v. Rakas, 439 U.S.
128, 143-144 (1978)) (holding that "in order to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, a
defendant must demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched,
and that his expectation is reasonable; i.e., one that has 'a source outside of the Fourth Amendment,
either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are
recognized and permitted by society."'). The Carter Court noted that the "statement that 'anyone
legitimately on the premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality,' was expressly
repudiated in Rakas v. lllinois. Thus, an overnight guest in a home may claim the protection of the
Fourth Amendment, but one who is merely present with the consent of the householder may not."
Carter, 525 U.S. at 90 (citations omitted). In Howard's case, he is in a situation where if he claims
an expectation of privacy at Barner's apartment, he would be subject to reasonable suspicionless
searches. See Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2202 (2006). On the other hand, if Howard
claims that he does not have an expectation of privacy at the apartment as an overnight guest, he will
not have standing to assert a Fourth Amendment violation. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143.
189 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, 1., concurring).
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the rights of a place, rather than those of a person. 190 The court held that
Howard's Fourth Amendment privacy rights were violated when officers
conducted the search of the West Bonanza apartment without sufficient
probable cause to believe Howard was a resident at the apartment. 191
However, this holding implicitly asserts that it was the apartment's
Fourth Amendment rights that were violated by the search, not Howard's
privacy rights. 192
If Howard was not a resident of the West Bonanza apartment, he did
not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment. 193
Therefore, Howard lacked standing to assert that his Fourth Amendment
right to privacy had been violated. l94 Howard's contention that the
search was unconstitutional essentially protected the Fourth Amendment
rights of a third person, Barner, which violates the Supreme Court's
holding in United States v. Rakas, that standing to assert such rights is
personal to the individual and cannot be vicariously asserted. 195 The
Howard court's holding protected the Fourth Amendment rights of the
apartment to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, not the
rights of Howard. 196 Therefore, the Howard court's holding was in error
on two alternative grounds. It either (1) improperly protected the Fourth
Amendment rights of a place in violation of the Katz decision,197 or (2) it
protected Howard's Fourth Amendment rights to a reasonable
expectation of privacy at the apartment, failing to consider that such an

190

See United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257, 1268 (9th Cir. 2006).

191

[d.

192

[d. at 1268-69 (Noonan, J., concurring).

BlIt see Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91,96-97 (1990) (holding that overnight guests have
an expectation of privacy that "society is prepared to recognize"). However, due to Howard's status
as a probationer, he had a reduced expectation of privacy. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S.
112, 119 (200 I). Therefore, society does not have an interest in protecting the reduced expectation
of privacy of a probationer who is an overnight guest when the purpose of his or her stay is not
shelter in a friend's house, but to secretly engage in continuing criminal activity. See Olson, 495
U.S. at 96-97.
194 See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998); see also United States v. Rakas, 439 U.S.
128, 143 (\978) (holding that "capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends
not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the person who claims the
protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.").
195 See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 134-35 (holding that Fourth Amendment rights are personal to the
individual and cannot be vicariously asserted).
196 See generally Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Dally, 606
F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1979). This conclusion would be different if Barner asserted that the search
violated her Fourth Amendment or her civil rights. If Barner asserted the violation, this case would
be similar to Motley or Dally. See Motley, 432 F.3d at 1075; Dally, 606 F.2d at 863.
197 See United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257,1269 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Katz v. United
States, 389 U.s. 347, 351 (1967).
193
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expectation was reduced as a result of his status as a probationer. 198
V.

CONCLUSION

In United States v. Howard, the Ninth Circuit did not use the proper
standard to determine whether the search of the West Bonanza apartment
was reasonable. l99 The court failed to balance Howard's reduced
expectation of privacy with the legitimate governmental interest to
prevent Howard from engaging in continuing criminal activity.2oo If the
search was reasonable under this standard, it was constitutional. The
court's analysis rigidly followed circuit precedent that was not in
compliance with the Supreme Court's decisions in United States v.
Knights and Samson v. Calijomia. 201
The court further erred in making a distinction between
probationary searches and investigative searches?02
Legitimate
governmental interests cannot be furthered if a search is limited to
ascertaining whether probationers are complying with conditions of their
release. Additionally, the court's analysis protected the property rights
of Barner's apartment, not Fourth Amendment privacy rights, in
violation of the holding in Katz v. United States. 203 Alternatively, the
decision over-emphasized Howard's expectation of privacy in the
apartment, which was exactly what the conditions imposed on his release
were intended to prevent. 204 The court should have remanded the case to
the district court and ordered it to apply the Knights balancing test to
determine whether the search of the West Bonanza apartment was
reasonable. 205

198

See Howard, 447 F.3d at 1268-69; see also United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-20

(2001).
199 See Howard, 447 F.3d at 1268-69 (Noonan, J., concurring); see also supra notes 75-129
and accompanying text.
200 See supra notes 152-182 and accompanying text.
201 See Howard, 447 F.3d at 1268-69 (Noonan. J., concurring); Knights, 534 U.S. at 118-20;
Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2197 (2006).
202 See supra notes 143-151 and accompanying text.
203 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,351 (1967); see also supra notes 183-198 and
accompanying text.
204 See supra notes 152-167 and accompanying text.
205 See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-20 (2001).
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